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Abstract
In this paper we characterize the impact of production technology on the optimal product line design. We
analyze a problem in which a manufacturer segments the market on quality attributes and offers products that
are partial substitutes. Because consumers self-select from the product line, product cannibalization is an
issue. In addition, the manufacturer sets a production schedule in order to balance production setups with
accumulation of inventories in the presence of economies of scale. We show that simultaneous optimization of
the product line design and production schedule leads to insights that differ significantly from the common
intuition and assertions in the literature, which omits either the demand side or the supply side of the
equation. In particular, we demonstrate that more expensive production technology always leads to lower
product prices and may at the same time lead to higher quality products. Further, a less efficient production
technology does not necessarily increase total production costs or reduce consumer welfare. We also
demonstrate that in the presence of production technology, the demand cannibalization problem may distort
product quality upward or the number of products upward, which is contrary to the standard result.
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Product Line Design and Production Technology
Abstract: In this paper we characterize the impact of production technology on the optimal
product line design. We analyze a problem in which a manufacturer segments the market on
quality attributes and oﬀers products that are partial substitutes. Because consumers self-select
from the product line, product cannibalization is an issue. In addition, the manufacturer sets
a production schedule in order to balance production setups with accumulation of inventories in
the presence of economies of scale. We show that simultaneous optimization of the product line
design and production schedule leads to insights that diﬀer significantly from the common intuition
and assertions in the literature, which omits either the demand side or the supply side of the
equation. In particular, we demonstrate that more expensive production technology always leads
to lower product prices and may at the same time lead to higher-quality products. Further, a
less eﬃcient production technology does not necessarily increase total production costs or reduce
consumer welfare. We also demonstrate that in the presence of production technology, the demand
cannibalization problem may distort product quality upward or the number of products upward,
which is contrary to the standard result.
Key words : product line; segmentation; cannibalization; EOQ; scale economies; marketing-
manufacturing interface.
2
1 Introduction
Consumers seek product variety for a number of reasons (Hoch et al. 1999). First, greater variety
ensures that a consumer finds exactly what he/she wants. Second, when preferences are uncertain,
variety may oﬀer an option value. Third, consumers may have an inherent desire to try diﬀerent
alternatives. Although there are exceptions in which variety can have a negative eﬀect (see Gourville
and Soman 2005), it is a generally accepted proposition that oﬀering larger variety allows companies
to increase both demand and market share (Kotler 2002). However, it has also been long recognized
that a large number of products in the assortment is associated with dis-economies of scale and
increases in production and distribution costs (Lancaster 1990, Quelch and Kenny 1994). For
example, in a survey of product variety models, Lancaster (1990) points out that “scale economies
mean that the potential welfare or revenue gain from greater product variety must be balanced
against the lower unit production cost with fewer variants.” Hence, with the exception of a few firms
(e.g., Dell) that are able to manufacture products to customer order and avoid large inventories,
most companies face a trade-oﬀ between product variety and production costs, so that product-
line decisions should be made with production costs in mind (Eliashberg and Steinberg 1993).1
An intuitive corollary is that higher production costs should lead to a reduction in the number
of products oﬀered, higher prices (Bayus and Putsis 1999, Kekre and Srinivasan 1990) and lower
quality.
Surprisingly, empirical literature in marketing has had mixed success in finding evidence of
these eﬀects (Kekre and Srinivasan 1990), and there are very few models that provide guidance
with respect to the precise impact of production costs on product-line decisions. In particular, it
is often assumed in the extant literature that adding a product to the assortment simply results
in a fixed cost (see, e.g., Dobson and Kalish 1988, Yano and Dobson 1998). A simple example
showing this approach to be problematic is that an increase in fixed cost does not aﬀect product
quality or prices (unless the increase is so high that a product is dropped), which is contrary to the
common understanding that production costs should aﬀect product quality and prices. To improve
on this dimension we propose a dynamic model in which a product line and a production schedule
are set simultaneously. We consider a manufacturer who segments the market based on quality
attributes of the product, and, all else equal, consumers prefer higher quality. Examples of such
product lines are the same model of automobile that may come with various levels of gas-mileage
performance (e.g., hybrid or conventional engine), multiple variations of the same computer with
diﬀerent sizes of hard drives, processors of varying speeds, chemicals of diﬀerent purity, and paper
1For examples of companies whose product line decisions are informed by operational cost considerations see
Womack et al. (1990) for the auto industry and McCormack (1998) for the apparel industry.
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of diﬀerent density. Consumers are heterogeneous in their preferences for quality and self-select
from the product line. Hence, a lower-quality product can cannibalize the higher-quality product,
an eﬀect that the manufacturer must consider.
Consumers arrive dynamically and a firm sets a production schedule ensuring that an adequate
amount of product is manufactured. Dis-economies of scale, inventory carrying costs and fixed
production costs are the most frequently cited reasons to reduce product variety (see Lancaster 1990,
Eliashberg and Steinberg 1993). For example, automotive manufacturers struggle with increasing
product variety that results in lower demand per model and hence dis-economies of scale, higher
inventories and higher overhead expenses (Hayes and Wheelwright 1984). We incorporate all three
of these elements, for we also believe they are important determinants of optimal product-line
decisions. In our model production occurs in batches which incur fixed costs. Batch sizes have to
balance these costs with inventory carrying costs incurred between batches. Such a setup is common
for many manufacturing firms that have to manufacture products in advance of customer demand.
Figure 1. Paper positioning.
We focus on two important aspects of product line design (see Figure 1). The literature in
this area generally assumes that firms produce to order (an approach we call classical). First,
we analytically characterize the impact of production technology on product line design. This is
done by comparing the production-to-order setup with the more elaborate model, which includes
a production-to-stock setting, inventories and economies of scale. The second dimension of our
analysis is the impact of information in the presence of production technology. This is done by
comparing two settings: the benchmark setting with full information about consumer preferences
and the setting with asymmetric information. In the full information case, the firm knows the
preferences of individual consumers so that the cannibalization problem does not arise because the
firm can segment consumers perfectly. In the asymmetric information case, the firm cannot observe
the preferences of individual consumers and hence lower-quality products can cannibalize higher-
quality products. We demonstrate that these two factors–production technology and information–
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interact and have a major impact on the firm’s product-line decisions. Our main findings are:
• Production costs reduce a firm’s propensity to oﬀer multiple products in favor of oﬀering
fewer products when production costs are large enough. This eﬀect, however, is moderated
by the (dis)similarity of consumer segments. When consumer segments are relatively close to
each other, the firm oﬀers one composite product designed to serve multiple segments. When
consumer segments are far apart, the firm also reduces the number of products, but this time
through not serving consumers at the low end of the market.
• More expensive production technology (in the sense of higher relevant cost parameters) can
lead the firm to oﬀer a product line of higher (average) quality at a lower (average) price. This
occurs when the more expensive production technology makes it attractive to replace segment-
specific product oﬀerings with a composite product; economies of scale make it attractive to
increase the quality level, but the product must be priced relatively low in order to appeal
to the lower-end consumer segment. More generally, more expensive production technology
always leads to lower product prices. Hence, using product prices as proxies for production
costs, as is sometimes done in empirical studies, can be problematic because these variables
can be inversely related. This occurs because a more expensive production technology makes
producing lower quality products attractive.
• A firm oﬀering more products may have lower total production costs than a firm oﬀering
fewer products. This counter-intuitive finding is consistent with (and may help explain)
some empirical evidence on the relation between product variety and production costs (see
Kekre and Srinivasan 1990). This result relies on the fact that firms may diﬀer both in
their production technology and in the markets they face. Another result is that a firm with
less eﬃcient production technology has lower total production costs. This occurs because less
eﬃcient production technology makes producing lower quality products attractive and these
products are cheaper to produce. Finally, from the consumer welfare point of view, it can
be beneficial to have more expensive production technology. Again, this occurs when the
more expensive production technology makes it attractive to replace segment-specific product
oﬀerings with a composite product.
• Production technology alters the eﬀect and value of information about consumer preferences.
Under full information, the product line is “eﬃcient” in that it maximizes firm profit and
social welfare (Moorthy 1984). Typically (see Moorthy 1984, Desai 2001, Villas-Boas 2004,
etc.) the firm facing the cannibalization problem due to information asymmetry produces
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(weakly) fewer products which are of (weakly) lower quality than is eﬃcient. Further, prices
are distorted downward.2 We show that when production technology is considered, these
results may be reversed, i.e., the cannibalization problem may cause the firm to oﬀer more
products or they can be of higher quality than is eﬃcient. Further, prices may be distorted
upward. These results occur because the cannibalization problem may lead the firm to oﬀer
a segment-specific product line when a composite product is eﬃcient.
• Production technology may help mitigate eﬃciency losses due to information asymmetry.
While with production to order there are always distortions from the eﬃcient product line
(either in the number of products or in their quality), with production to stock these distortions
may be eliminated. Hence, the value to the firm of information about individual consumer
preferences may be zero. This occurs when the production technology makes serving the
lower-end of the market unattractive under full information.
Overall, our results demonstrate that close attention should be paid to the interplay between
the production technology and cannibalization problems associated with product line design. Si-
multaneous optimization of the product line design and production schedule leads to insights that
diﬀer significantly from the common intuition and assertions in the literature, which omits either
the demand side or the supply side of the equation. Therefore, without clear understanding of the
trade-oﬀs involved, there is potential for managers to make serious judgement errors.
The paper proceeds as follows. §2 surveys the related literature. §3 models the product line
design problem under full information and under asymmetric information. §4 compares the results
of these models and describes their implications. §5 discusses the impact of relaxing some of the
modeling assumptions and provides concluding remarks.
2 Literature Survey
The literature on product line design has a long history which is surveyed in Lancaster (1990),
Eliashberg and Steinberg (1993), Krishnan and Ulrich (2001) and Ramdas (2003). The stream of
work most relevant to our paper considers quality as a diﬀerentiating dimension along with price, and
allows consumers to self-select from variants oﬀered. We utilize the quality diﬀerentiation approach
for two reasons. First, production and inventory carrying costs typically depend on product quality
but may not be aﬀected by other diﬀerentiating dimensions (e.g., color). Second, we are interested
in studying the interaction between the cannibalization eﬀect and production costs.
2These results hold under the commonly invoked restriction that consumer utility functions satisfy the single-
crossing property (Moorthy 1984).
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The stream of research on quality diﬀerentiation was pioneered by Mussa and Rosen (1978), and
Moorthy (1984) was the first to introduce this framework into the marketing literature. In Moorthy
(1984) the monopolist oﬀers a menu of products with higher-quality products sold at higher prices.
Due to the cannibalization eﬀect, products are priced so that only consumers with the highest
valuation for quality receive their eﬃcient quality level, while all others receive products of lower
than their eﬃcient quality. Prices are distorted downward as well. Moreover, if the cannibalization
eﬀect is strong enough, the firm may choose not to serve low-valuation segments of consumers
by oﬀering less than the eﬃcient number of products. As noted above, these classical results
appear in many subsequent papers. We show that these well-accepted results may be reversed
when the production technology is considered explicitly. Other papers modeling product variety
with quality diﬀerentiation incorporate channel considerations (see Villas-Boas 1998), marketing
costs of communicating with consumers (see Villas-Boas 2004) and competition (see Desai 2001),
issues we do not explore here. In all of these papers the marginal cost of production is assumed to be
convex increasing in product quality and fixed costs/inventories are not modeled. Complementing
this analytical work, empirical researchers have examined the impact of variety on sales (see, e.g.,
Borle et al. 2005).
On the supply side, economists have long recognized that production costs often exhibit economies
of scale that will typically aﬀect the number of products oﬀered by a monopolist (see Dixit and
Stiglitz 1977, Panzar and Willig 1977). Much progress has been made on coordinating marketing
and operations decisions (see Eliashberg and Steinberg 1993 for a survey and Ho and Tang 1998
for a representative set of articles, among which Chen et al. 1998 is the most relevant). Eliashberg
and Steinberg (1993) identify the combination of the joint product mix and economic lot-scheduling
problem (of which our model is one example) as a fruitful direction for future research.
The papers that are most relevant to our work examine the product line design problem, but
with particular attention to the details of the production technology and associated costs. In a
product line design setting, Dobson and Kalish (1988) consider product-specific variable and fixed
costs. However, the model is static (so inventory is not modeled) and these costs are independent
of other decision variables and demand volume. Even with these simplifications their formulation
leads to a complex mixed-integer program that must be solved numerically. While the goal in
Dobson and Kalish (1988) is to develop solution methodology for practically-sized problems, we
limit the size of the problem to obtain analytical solutions that lend themselves to analysis and
interpretations.
In Kim and Chhajed (2000) the firm utilizes component commonality to mitigate the cost of
product variety. Desai et al. (2001) and Heese and Swaminathan (2005) generalize this setup to
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allow the manufacturing cost to be mitigated by exerting the design eﬀort. These papers demon-
strate that the benefits of component commonality have to be balanced against dilution in model
diﬀerentiation. This finding is roughly in the same spirit as one of our results (the benefits of
product variety have to be balanced with supply-side considerations), although their focus on com-
ponent commonality is distinct. Van Ryzin and Mahajan (1999) and Hopp and Xu (2004, 2005) use
logit models of demand and examine cost eﬀects on product-line decisions. Van Ryzin and Maha-
jan (1999) use a “newsvendor” model to capture inventory costs that increase with the number of
products oﬀered, and they analyze the resulting revenue-cost trade-oﬀ. Hopp and Xu (2004, 2005)
consider production systems that exhibit economies of scope but not scale and show that greater
component commonality increases the number of products oﬀered.
Finally, empirical researchers have analyzed linkages between variety and production costs but
have arrived at contradicting conclusions. Kekre and Srinivasan (1990) find that manufacturing and
inventory costs decrease when product variety is expanded (because of the economies of scale due
to the market share increase) while Bayus and Putsis (1999) find that the cost increases associated
with a broader product line dominate any potential demand increases. Our analytical model may
help in reconciling these conflicting results; we also discuss other considerations that may improve
future econometric studies.
3 Model
To examine a monopolist’s marketing and production decisions, we consider a model which combines
the product line design problem proposed by Moorthy (1984) with the classical EOQ (Economic
Order Quantity) production cost model. We chose to analyze simple functional forms to facilitate
closed-form characterizations of the optimal product line that lead to clean analytical results. We
believe that our main insights are robust to our particular model specification, and we discuss the
implications of generalizing the model in §5.
On the demand side, we assume that consumers3 belong to one of two segments. Consumers
of type t = {L,H} have valuation θtq for the product, where q represents product quality and
θH > θL. Although throughout the paper we interpret q as product quality, it can be thought of
as a combination of many of the product’s characteristics. In our analysis we follow the traditional
analytical literature on vertical diﬀerentiation in assuming that quality is one-dimensional, although
in practice there might be several quality dimensions that cannot be uniquely ordered. Each con-
sumer’s utility for the product is θtq − p, where p is the product’s price. If a consumer does not
3Although we refer to the firm’s customers as “consumers” throughout the paper, these can also be other firms.
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purchase a product she receives her reservation utility, which is normalized to zero. Consumers of
type t exogenously arrive at a deterministic rate of λt per unit time. Upon arrival, each consumer
decides which product, if any, to purchase based on the oﬀered products’ qualities and prices. Thus,
the actual demand rate experienced for a specific product depends on the qualities and prices of all
the oﬀered products. This is perhaps the simplest model that can capture this dynamic. Although
our setup assumes that the firm does not influence the size (arrival rate) of each consumer segment,
§5 describes the extension to a continuum of types, in which case the size of consumer segments is
made endogenous.
On the supply side, we explicitly model the production costs using the EOQ model, which
is classical in operations management (see, for example, Lal and Staelin 1984, De Groote 1994,
Cachon and Terwiesch 2004). The EOQ model is dynamic and assumes that the firm produces
each product in batches, carries inventory between batch production and has to perform costly
production setups for each batch. Moreover, production costs depend on product characteristics
because higher-quality products are more expensive to hold in inventory. Finally, the EOQ model
exhibits economies of scale: the per-unit production cost is decreasing in the demand rate.
We assume that the cost of building one unit of product with quality q is aq2, which we refer
to as the quality cost. The quadratic form reflects the increasing marginal quality cost; a can
be interpreted as the costliness of quality, where a > 0. Each product the firm manufactures is
instantly produced to stock in batches of sizeQ. The batch size essentially determines the production
schedule. The firm incurs fixed setup cost K ≥ 0 for each batch.4 Once the batch is produced, the
firm sells inventory to consumers until it is depleted, at which point a new batch is produced. Each
unit of inventory incurs a holding cost that is proportional to the product’s cost iaq2; i ≥ 0 is the
cost of capital. Together {a, i,K} characterize the production technology, and we refer to these
parameters as “production cost parameters.” For convenience, we denote Z =
√
2aiK, which can be
interpreted as an aggregate measure of the production cost parameters, with higher Z corresponding
to less eﬃcient production technology. The firm determines the number of products to oﬀer and
selects the quality q, price p and production batch size Q for each product to maximize the profit
rate per unit time. Because the arrival rates are constant, these three decisions can be made once
in the beginning. Whether these decisions are made sequentially or simultaneously does not aﬀect
the solution; for simplicity, we present the simultaneous decision case.
4Although we describe the firm as producing its own products, the model also captures the situation in which the
firm instead purchases from an outside supplier, incurring the fixed cost K each time it places an order in addition
to the quadratic per-unit cost.
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3.1 Full Information
We begin our analysis by studying the full information case. Here, the firm can observe consumer
types and can tailor its product oﬀering and price to each individual consumer (perfect market seg-
mentation) and hence products do not cannibalize each other. In particular, the firm can customize
its price by consumer, so that diﬀerent consumers pay may diﬀerent prices for the same product.
We study the full information case for two reasons. The primary reason is that the solution to
this case is “eﬃcient” in that it maximizes firm profit (in this idealized case) and social welfare.
Comparing the results in this setting to the considerably more common case, in which the firm is
unable to observe the preferences of its consumers, reveals the value of information about consumer
preferences and the way information asymmetry distorts decisions away from the eﬃcient decision.
The second reason is that there may be practical situations where a firm can tailor its product
oﬀering and price to each individual consumer. This may occur when the consumer is ill-informed
and so relies on the firm to direct it to an appropriate product. Over the course of the sales process,
a skilled salesperson may be able to decipher the consumer’s preferences and direct the consumer
to a specific price-product oﬀering. This will be facilitated if the usual practice is for prices to be
“negotiated.” However, if consumers are well-informed, the prospect of arbitrage among consumers
would prevent the firm from pursuing this approach. Further, when a firm’s consumers are businesses
that compete in a common market, diﬀerential pricing violates U.S. law when “the eﬀect of such
discrimination may be to substantially lessen competition” amongst these downstream competitors
(Dolan and Simon 1996).
In the classical full information problem (see Moorthy 1984) the ability to perfectly price dis-
criminate leads the firm to design one product for each consumer segment. When the firm sells one
product to each segment, the firm’s product line design and production scheduling problem is
max
qL,qH ,QL,QH ,pL,pH
πFI2 =
X
t=L,H
∙¡
pt − aq2t
¢
λt −
λtK
Qt
− iaq
2
tQt
2
¸
, (1)
s.t. θtqt − pt ≥ 0, t = L,H,
where type-t consumers purchase the product of quality qt and pay price pt. The objective function
in (1) represents the profit rate per unit time; the first term is revenue less quality cost rate, the
second term is the setup cost rate (with λt/Qt setups per unit time) and the third term is the
inventory holding cost rate (with an average inventory level of Qt/2). Therefore, a larger batch size
Qt reduces setup costs but increases inventory holding costs and vice versa. Although it is possible
to oﬀer two products, as we show below, due to the economies of scale in production, it might be
more profitable for the firm to design just one product and sell it to both consumer segments at
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diﬀerent prices. We call such a product “composite” and denote its quality, batch size and price by
a subscript “C”. When selling the composite product, the firm’s problem is
max
qC ,QC ,pCL,pCH
πFI1 =
X
t=L,H
£¡
pCt − aq2C
¢
λt
¤
− (λL + λH)K
QC
− iaq
2
CQC
2
, (2)
s.t. θtqC − pCt ≥ 0, t = L,H,
where pCt denotes the price charged type-t consumers.
Denote the optimal solution that solves max
©
πFI1,πFI2
ª
with the superscript “∗”. The following
proposition summarizes the solution under full information. In the appendix all proofs are provided
and the constant zFI is defined in closed-form.
Proposition 1 Under full information, the optimal product line, batch sizes, prices, and resulting
profit are as follows:
(i) If Z < min
¡
θL
√
λL, zFI
¢
, then the firm oﬀers two products and
q∗t =
θt − Z/
√
λt
2a
, t = L,H,
Q∗t =
r
2Kλt
ia
1
q∗t
, t = L,H,
p∗t = θtq
∗
t , t = L,H,
π∗ =
1
4a
X
t=L,H
³
θt
p
λt − Z
´2
.
(ii) If θH < θL(1 +
p
1 + λL/λH) and zFI ≤ Z < (θLλL + θHλH)/
√
λL + λH , then the firm oﬀers
one composite product that serves both consumer segments and
q∗C =
(θLλL + θHλH) / (λL + λH)− Z/
√
λL + λH
2a
,
Q∗C =
r
2K (λL + λH)
ia
1
q∗C
,
p∗Ct = θtq
∗
C , t = L,H,
π∗ =
£
(θLλL + θHλH) /
√
λL + λH − Z
¤2
4a
.
(iii) If θH > θL(1 +
p
1 + λL/λH) and θL
√
λL ≤ Z < θH
√
λH , then q∗L = Q
∗
L = p
∗
L = 0, the firm
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oﬀers one product that serves high-valuation consumer segment and
q∗H =
θH − Z/
√
λH
2a
,
Q∗H =
r
2KλH
ia
1
q∗H
,
p∗H = θHq
∗
H ,
π∗ =
¡
θH
√
λH − Z
¢2
4a
.
Otherwise, no product is oﬀered.
The solution in Proposition 1 is best explained using the graphic representation in Figure 2,
which depicts the solution as a function of θH , which can be interpreted as how far apart consumer
segments are, and Z, which is an aggregate measure of the production cost parameters. Although
the figure is plotted for a specific set of problem parameters (in particular, λL = λH), all insights
are not parameter-specific because only the relative size of the regions changes and not the solu-
tion structure. The boundaries between the regions correspond to the closed-form thresholds in
Proposition 1.
Consider the solution at Z = 0 (meaning that either K = 0 or i = 0) which corresponds
to the classical full information problem (see Moorthy 1984), where setup and inventory costs
are not considered. In this case it is always optimal to oﬀer two products with qualities q∗L =
θL/(2a) < θH/(2a) = q∗H , which is called a “separating” solution (because diﬀerent consumer types
buy separate products). If production costs are relatively small as in area (i), the firm still finds it
profitable to manufacture two products, each targeting a diﬀerent consumer segment. However, as
production costs increase, a diﬀerent solution emerges.
Figure 2. Full information.
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When consumer segments are relatively close to each other in preferences and production costs
are relatively significant as in area (ii), the firm finds it profitable to oﬀer just one composite product
that is sold to both high-valuation and low-valuation consumers. This solution is termed “pooling”
(see Moorthy 1984) and it does not arise in the absence of setup and holding costs.5 In the absence
of such costs, the firm would tailor the quality of each product to the segment it serves. On the
one hand, producing a single product reduces the contribution (revenue less quality cost) from the
product line, because such tailoring is impossible. On the other hand, producing a single product
allows the firm to take advantage of economies of scale in production and so reduce total production
costs. The gain in contribution from tailoring the products’ quality levels is relatively small when
the consumers have similar preferences, and so in this region the latter eﬀect dominates: oﬀering
a single composite product is optimal. This region is relatively large because even when the firm
sells a single product (and so is not able to tailor its quality levels), it is able to tailor its prices to
each segment.
Finally, if consumer segments are far apart in their preferences and production costs are sig-
nificant as in area (iii), the firm decides not to serve low-valuation consumers and only serves
high-valuation consumers. Because the segments are far apart in their preferences, tailoring the
quality levels to each segment is more attractive than serving both segments with a single product.
However, oﬀering a product aimed solely at low-valuation consumers would entail incurring a loss
(because of high Z); the higher willingness to pay of the high-valuation segment makes a product
aimed at this segment economically viable. Hence, the firm implements an “exclusion” policy, in
which it does not serve one consumer segment. Again, this solution does not arise in the absence
of setup and holding costs under full information. Finally, with high enough production costs, no
product is oﬀered. Naturally, the higher the θH , the smaller the area in which no product is oﬀered.
3.2 Asymmetric Information
We now turn our attention to the setting with asymmetric information arising when the firm is
unable to observe the preferences of individual consumers. The firm may oﬀer a product of quality
and price (qH , pH) designed for the high-valuation segment and product (qL, pL) designed for the
low-valuation segment. However, a consumer may find a product designed for another segment more
attractive than the product designed for her own segment, and so the firm faces a cannibalization
problem. To prevent this cannibalization, two incentive compatibility constraints are added to the
5The pooling solution may arise if the utility function does not satisfy the single-crossing property. Our utility
function is multiplicatively separable, so it satisfies this property.
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formulation (1):
max
qL,qH ,QL,QH ,pL,pH
πAI2 =
X
t=L,H
∙¡
pt − aq2t
¢
λt −
λtK
Qt
− iaq
2
tQt
2
¸
, (3)
s.t. θLqL − pL ≥ 0, (4)
θHqH − pH ≥ 0, (5)
θLqL − pL ≥ θLqH − pH , (6)
θHqH − pH ≥ θHqL − pL. (7)
Constraints (6) and (7) ensure that, correspondingly, low-valuation (high-valuation) consumers do
not find it more attractive to buy the product designed for high-valuation (low-valuation) consumers.
Similar to the full information case, we also need to consider the alternative in which a single product
is sold to both consumer segments. Note that in this case it suﬃces to satisfy the reservation utility
constraint of the low-valuation consumers only and there are no incentive-compatibility constraints.
The resulting formulation is:
max
qC ,QC ,pC
πAI1 =
¡
pC − aq2C
¢
(λL + λH)−
(λL + λH)K
QC
− iaq
2
CQC
2
, (8)
s.t. θLqC − pC ≥ 0. (9)
Denote the optimal solution that solves max
©
πAI1,πAI2
ª
with the superscript “#”. The next
proposition summarizes the solution under asymmetric information. The constant zAI is defined in
the appendix.
Proposition 2 Under asymmetric information, the optimal product line, batch sizes, prices, and
resulting profit are as follows:
(i) If Z < min
¡
(θLλL − (θH − θL)λH) /
√
λL, zAI
¢
, then the firm oﬀers two products and
q#L =
θL − (θH − θL)λH/λL − Z/
√
λL
2a
, q#H =
θH − Z/
√
λH
2a
,
Q#t =
r
2Kλt
ia
1
q#t
, t = L,H,
p#L = θLq
#
L , p
#
H = θLq
#
L + θH
³
q#H − q
#
L
´
,
π# =
£
(θLλL − (θH − θL)λH)/
√
λL − Z
¤2
+
¡
θH
√
λH − Z
¢2
4a
.
(ii) If θH < θL
p
1 + λL/λH and zAI ≤ Z < θL
√
λL + λH , then the firm oﬀers one composite product
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that serves both consumer segments and
q#C =
θL − Z/
√
λL + λH
2a
,
Q#C =
r
2K (λL + λH)
ia
1
q#C
,
p#C = θLq
#
C ,
π# =
¡
θL
√
λL + λH − Z
¢2
4a
.
(iii) If θH > θL
p
1 + λL/λH and (θLλL − (θH − θL)λH) /
√
λL ≤ Z < θH
√
λH , then q
#
L = Q
#
L =
p#L = 0, the firm oﬀers one product that serves high-valuation consumer segment and
q#H =
θH − Z/
√
λH
2a
,
Q#H =
r
2KλH
ia
1
q#H
,
p#H = θHq
#
H ,
π# =
¡
θH
√
λH − Z
¢2
4a
.
Otherwise, no product is oﬀered.
Similar to the full information case, the intuition behind this Proposition can be explained
using graphical representation of the solution in Figure 3. Again, although the figure is plotted for
a specific set of problem parameters (in particular, λL = λH), all insights are not parameter-specific
because only the relative size of the regions changes and not the solution structure. First, consider
the solution at Z = 0 (meaning that either K = 0 or i = 0), which corresponds to the classical
problem with asymmetric information in Moorthy (1984). Consistent with Moorthy (1984), there
are two possibilities. If consumer segments are not too far apart, it is optimal to oﬀer two products
with qualities q#H = θH/(2a) and q
#
L = θL/(2a) − (θH − θL)λH/ (2aλL) , a separating solution.
However, when consumer segments are far apart, the firm implements an exclusion policy: it only
serves the segment with high valuations. This happens because when two products are oﬀered
high-valuation consumers capture utility in excess of their reservation utilities (which is called
“informational rent”), while low-valuation consumers only receive their reservation utilities (see the
proof of Proposition 2). Hence, the firm has to give up some profit in order to elicit consumer types
when information asymmetry (product cannibalization) is present. If consumer segments are very
far apart, this informational rent becomes too high and the firm prefers not to serve low-valuation
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consumers. In this case the single product is priced at the high-valuation consumers’ reservation
level, which makes it too expensive for low-valuation consumers. Because high-valuation consumers
no longer extract informational rent, more profit is left for the firm.
Figure 3. Asymmetric information.
As production costs increase, the region (i) in which the firm oﬀers two products shrinks more
quickly than without asymmetric information (in Figure 2). This happens because, in addition to
dis-economies of scale in production, the firm also has to give up informational rent due to infor-
mation asymmetry. Hence, economies of scale in production are reinforced by the cannibalization
problem. The firm can respond by either decreasing the production cost through manufacturing
just one (composite) product or by reducing informational rent through excluding low-valuation
consumers. The former is preferred when consumer segments are close together, and the latter is
preferred when consumer segments are far apart.
When consumer segments are relatively close to each other in preferences and production costs
are significant as in the area (ii), the firm finds it profitable to oﬀer just one composite product
that is sold to both high- and low-valuation consumers. This product must be priced to make it
attractive for the low-valuation consumer segment. When consumer segments are close together in
preferences, there is little loss in revenue in doing so, and by selling one product to both segments
the firm takes advantage of economies of scale in production. When consumer segments are far
apart in their preferences as in the area (iii), the firm decides not to serve low-valuation consumers
in order to avoid giving up informational rents to high-valuation consumers and in order to avoid
selling the low-quality product at a loss. Recall that only the latter reason was present with full
information. Hence, the informational rents are responsible for the much larger area (iii) under
asymmetric information than under full information. Finally, for very high production costs no
product is oﬀered.
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4 Comparisons and Implications
This section investigates how the interplay between production technology and information asymme-
try aﬀects the number of products, their qualities and prices, consumer welfare and total production
costs. In particular, we describe how the optimal product line changes in response to the exogenous
production cost parameters. We want to emphasize that our model takes the exogenous parameters
as being static and so does not describe how a firm should dynamically change its product line
over time. Accordingly, our comparative statics results should be interpreted as describing how the
one-time product-line decision changes in response to changes in the underlying parameters. For
graphical illustrations we continue to assume that λL = λH , but all conclusions are easily verified
for a more general case with λL 6= λH . We state our findings in the form of results without proofs:
although some of these proofs are quite tedious, they are relatively straightforward and follow from
Propositions 1 and 2. Unless stated otherwise, all results hold for both the full and asymmetric
information cases.
4.1 Impact on Number of Products
By examining Figures 2 and 3 we clearly see that the number of products oﬀered to the market
under both full and asymmetric information decreases in the production cost parameters (Z). This
result is seemingly intuitive in view of the economies of scale, which favor oﬀering fewer products.
This is, however, only part of the story. As discussed above, economies of scale in production lead to
product consolidation only when consumer segments are suﬃciently close to each other. Otherwise,
the shift towards fewer products happens through excluding low-valuation consumers.
Result 1 As production cost parameters increase, the number of products oﬀered (weakly) decreases.
When consumer segments are close (far), this happens without (with) excluding low-valuation con-
sumers.
Further, in the absence of production technology considerations, we know (Moorthy 1984) that
the firm oﬀers no more products under asymmetric information than under full information (recall
that the full information solution is eﬃcient in that it maximizes social welfare). That is, due to the
cannibalization problem, the firm may opt to oﬀer a single product (and thus exclude low-valuation
consumers), while under full information this does not happen. The situation changes significantly
when the impact of production technology is accounted for, and Figure 4 concisely summarizes the
diﬀerences in the number of products oﬀered to the market,6 where N∗ denotes the optimal number
of products under full information and N# denotes this quantity under asymmetric information.
6Even when the number of products is the same, diﬀerent markets can be served, an issue we discuss in §4.2.
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Figure 4. The impact of information asymmetry on the number of products.
Figure 4 shows that the impact of information depends on the cost of production technology.
Under information asymmetry the firm may introduce a larger (area A), smaller (areas B and C),
or equal (all other areas) number of products compared to the eﬃcient product line. Perhaps the
most surprising result occurs when production costs are relatively small and market segments are
moderately distinct in their preferences (area A). Here the firm actually oﬀers more products under
information asymmetry than is eﬃcient. This result occurs because under full information the firm
is able to tailor the price to each segment even while it takes advantage of economies of scale by
oﬀering a single composite product; when segments are similar enough and production costs are large
enough (as they are in area A), this is optimal. In contrast, under asymmetric information, if the
firm is to charge the segments diﬀerent prices, it must oﬀer two distinct products. When consumer
segments are moderately heterogenous and production costs are relatively small, tailoring the prices
is more important than taking advantage of economies of scale, and so the firm oﬀers two products.
Result 2 The optimal number of products when the cannibalization problem is present can be larger,
the same, or smaller than is eﬃcient.
4.2 Impact on Prices, Product Qualities and Product Line Length
In this section we consider the impact of production technology and information asymmetry on both
the quality and price paid by each consumer segment as well as on average quality and price, where
these terms denote averages weighted by demand rates. One would expect that as the costliness
of quality, a, increases, product quality decreases. This is the case when no other production costs
are present. When setup and inventory costs are present, it continues to be true in most situations,
as can be verified from Propositions 1 and 2. There is, however, an exception. Due to the rise
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in a, the firm may switch from oﬀering two products to oﬀering one composite product. At the
moment this happens, one can verify for both full and asymmetric information that the average
quality increases:
qC >
λLqL + λHqH
λL + λH
(10)
and that the quality of the composite product lies between that of the individual products:
qL < qC < qH . (11)
Thus, surprisingly, as the costliness of quality increases, both the quality of the product purchased
by low-valuation consumers and the average quality purchased actually increase. This result occurs
because switching to a composite product pushes down the cost of providing a given level of quality
because of economies of scale, which makes it attractive to increase the average quality level (10).
Result 3 The quality of the product purchased by high-valuation consumers is decreasing in the
costliness of quality. The quality of the product purchased by low-valuation consumers may increase
in the costliness of quality. Further, the average quality may increase in the costliness of quality.7
It is generally assumed that higher production costs should increase prices (see Bayus and Putsis
1999), the intuition being that the firm will pass on higher production costs to consumers in the
form of higher prices. On the other hand, higher production costs will typically result in lower
quality, which favors lower prices. In our model, the prices the firm can charge are solely a function
of the quality levels of the products (consumers’ willingness to pay is unaﬀected by how costly
production is for the firm), so this second eﬀect dominates: prices are decreasing in the production
cost parameters.
In general, there would seem to be a clear relationship between quality and prices, so that as
quality increases, prices do as well. At the moment the production cost hits the threshold where it
is more attractive to oﬀer one composite product, average quality increases (10), so following this
logic, one would expect average price to increase as well. In fact, the opposite happens (both under
full and asymmetric information):
λLp∗CL + λHp
∗
CH
λL + λH
<
λLp∗L + λHp
∗
H
λL + λH
and p#C <
λLp
#
L + λHp
#
H
λL + λH
.
To see the intuition, observe that when the firm shifts from oﬀering two products to a composite
product, the price paid by the low-valuation segment increases and the price paid by the high-
valuation segment decreases. Because changes in quality lead to a larger change in the willingness
7Result 3 also holds when “costliness of quality” is replaced by the more general term “production cost parame-
ters.”
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to pay for the high-valuation segment, the latter eﬀect dominates. Thus, surprisingly, for the
optimal product line, the average quality and price can move in opposite directions in response to
changes in the underlying production cost parameters.
Result 4 The individual product prices as well as the average price are decreasing in the production
cost parameters. An increase in the production cost parameters can simultaneously increase the
average quality and decrease the average price.
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Figure 5. Quality levels.
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Figures 5 and 6 illustrate Results 3 and 4 by depicting the qualities and prices for individual
products and on average under asymmetric information as a function of the costliness of quality a
for parameters λH = 1.0, λL = 5.0, θH = 2.3, θL = 1.0, K = 1.0 and i = 0.1. When the costliness
of quality a crosses the threshold such that oﬀering a composite product becomes attractive, the
average quality jumps up 30% and the average price jumps down 12%.
We now turn to the impact of information on quality and prices, beginning with quality. The
impact of information on product quality is best illustrated graphically (see Figure 7). A standard
restriction, which our model satisfies, is that valuation function V satisfy the single-crossing property
∂2V/∂q∂θ > 0: higher-valuation consumers are willing to pay more for an increase in quality than
lower-valuation consumers. A classical result (see Moorthy 1984) asserts that, with this restriction,
product quality under asymmetric information is not higher than under full information. Namely,
the quality of the product targeting the highest-valuation consumers is the same (“no distortion
at the top”), but the quality of the product targeting lower-valuation consumers is lower under
asymmetric information. This result is due to the incentive compatibility constraint (7) forcing
the firm to distort the quality of the product targeting lower-valuation consumers downwards to
ensure that higher-valuation consumers do not find it attractive and the low-quality product does
not cannibalize the high-quality product. This logic is manifested in our case when Z = 0. But,
just as is the case with the number of products, product quality under asymmetric information can
be higher than, equal to, or lower than product quality under full information, depending on the
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combination of problem parameters. We will discuss two of the most interesting cases.
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Figure 7. Distortions of product quality.
First, consider the scenario in the upper-right-hand corner of Figure 7, which occurs when
production technology is expensive and consumer segments are far apart. In this case the distortion
introduced by the cannibalization problem disappears: the quality of the only product on the
market is the same with or without information asymmetry. This happens because the firm finds it
profitable to sell just one product to high-valuation consumers, whether information is asymmetric
or not, allowing the firm to extract all utility from these consumers and hence achieve the eﬃcient
outcome. Therefore, we have the somewhat surprising result that the presence of inferior (more
costly) production technology may actually reduce the firm’s value of information about individual
consumer preferences to zero.
As a more extreme example, consider the scenario in the center of Figure 7 in which the firm
oﬀers a composite product under full information and one high-quality product under asymmetric
information. In this region, the product quality oﬀered by the firm in the presence of asymmetric
information is higher than the eﬃcient level, the opposite of what we know from the classical
analysis of the same problem. The intuition for why the inclusion of production costs reverses the
classical result is as follows: Without economies of scale in production, the firm would tailor the
quality of each product to the segment it serves. Economies of scale make it attractive to pool
consumer segments, which entails oﬀering a lower quality level than would be oﬀered if the product
were tailored to the high-valuation segment. Further, just as in the case without production costs,
information asymmetry makes it more attractive to exclude low-valuation consumers. Hence, when
production cost and consumer heterogeneity are moderate, information asymmetry causes the firm
to oﬀer a single product targeted to high-valuation consumers, which is consequently of high quality.
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In contrast, without information asymmetry, the firm serves both markets with a single product,
which entails oﬀering a lower-quality product. The reversal of the classical result applies only to
high-valuation consumers; as in the case without setup and holding costs, low-valuation consumers
always receive lower quality under asymmetric information.
Result 5 The impact of information asymmetry is to distort the quality and price of the product
serving low-valuation consumers downward from the eﬃcient level. The quality and price of the
product serving high-valuation consumers can be distorted upward, downward or not at all. The
average quality and average price can be distorted upward, downward or not at all.
A final observation related to this result is that the impact of production cost on distortions in
product quality is not monotone. For example, in the middle area of Figure 7 the quality distortion
q∗C − q
#
H is first decreasing in Z until q
∗
C = q
#
H (there is no distortion at all), at which point the
distortion starts increasing.
The previous section noted that as production costs exceed a threshold, the product line is
shortened in that it is optimal to replace a two-product line with a single product. The remainder
of this section focuses on the impact of production costs on the product line length when the optimal
product line has more than one product, i.e., qH − qL. As the production cost parameters increase,
the quality levels of both products decrease, but the impact on each product’s quality diﬀers. In
the absence of setup and holding costs, it is intuitive that an increase in the costliness of quality
a has a larger impact on the quality of the high-quality product, so that the product line length
shortens. This intuition extends to the case with setup and holding costs.
More interesting is the impact of the cost of capital i and the setup cost K on the length
of the product line. Because these costs reflect economies of scale in production, the impact of
changes in these parameters on the optimal quality level of a product is small when the product
is targeted at a consumer segment with large demand. Conversely, when the targeted segment is
small, quality is very sensitive to changes in these cost parameters. Consequently, whether changes
in these parameters lead to a shortening of the product line (due to a larger decrease in the quality
of the high-quality product) or a lengthening of the product line (due to a larger change for the
low-quality product) depends on the relative size of the high- and low-valuation segments. When
the high-valuation segment is larger (i.e., λH > λL), an increase in these cost parameters lengthens
the product line; when this segment is smaller, the opposite results.
Result 6 When the product line includes two products, the product line length is increasing in the
cost of capital i and the setup cost K if and only if the high-valuation segment is larger than the
low-valuation segment. The product line length is decreasing in the costliness of quality a.
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4.3 Impact on Total Production Cost
The extant literature proposed that a higher number of products leads to higher total production
cost (see e.g., Eliashberg and Steinberg 1993, Ho and Tang 1998). Given this consideration, pre-
vious papers modeled fixed costs associated with including a product in the product line (see e.g.,
Dobson and Kalish 1988). However, empirical literature has had diﬃculty confirming this asser-
tion. For example, Kekre and Srinivasan (1990) found a “lack of strong negative impact of broader
product line on . . .manufacturing costs.” Our stylized model may oﬀer a plausible explanation of
this contradiction, although we do not account for certain eﬀects that are present in their paper.
To examine total production costs, consider the full information case with two products oﬀered
(all other cases can be shown to follow the same pattern). The total profit can be written as follows:
π∗ =
1
2a
X
t=L,H
³
θ2tλt − θLZ
p
λL
´
− 1
4a
X
t=L,H
¡
θ2tλt − Z2
¢
.
The first summation term represents revenues while the second summation term represents total
production cost. Note that, surprisingly, total production cost is decreasing in all cost-related
parameters (a, i and K). This happens because, as these parameters increase, the firm responds
by oﬀering products of lower quality and at lower prices which reduces both revenues and costs.
This finding is in sharp contrast with both the common intuition and predictions following from
the classical EOQ model. As another observation, note that higher θH (indicating more dis-similar
consumer segments) is associated with higher total production cost. Thus, a firm oﬀering one
composite product and facing larger cost-related parameters as well as more dis-similar consumer
segments may have higher total production cost than a firm oﬀering two products but facing smaller
cost-related parameters as well as more similar consumer segments. This happens if the reduction
in total production cost due to higher cost-related parameters is dominated by the increase in total
production costs due to the larger dis-similarity of consumer segments.
Result 7 Total production cost is decreasing in the cost-related parameters a, i and K, so that a
less eﬃcient firm has lower total production cost. Moreover, a firm with a higher number of products
may have lower total production cost than a firm with a smaller number of products.
4.4 Impact on Consumer Welfare
So far our analysis has focused on the firm’s profits, but now we consider consumer welfare. Under
full information consumer welfare is always zero because the firm extracts all the consumers’ utility.
In contrast, under asymmetric information consumers with high valuations may earn informational
rent, while consumers with low valuations always receive only their zero reservation utility. In
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the absence of setup and holding costs, consumer welfare is decreasing in the costliness of quality,
a: the firm responds to higher quality costs by producing lower-quality products, which reduces
the utility captured by high-valuation consumers. When setup and holding costs are considered,
this result can be reversed. To see why, observe that with these costs the firm may oﬀer one
composite product. High-valuation consumers receive positive utility when either two products or
one composite product is oﬀered, but receive zero utility when one high-quality product is oﬀered.
If the number of products does not change, consumer welfare decreases monotonically in production
costs. If, however, the number of products changes from two products to one composite product
as a increases, consumer welfare jumps up. The intuition is that the utility (informational rent)
that a high-valuation consumer receives is the utility she would receive if she purchased the product
intended for the low-valuation segment. With q denoting the quality of this product, a high-
valuation consumer receives utility θHq − θLq, where the first term represents her valuation and
the second term represents the price. Consumer welfare jumps up at the point when it becomes
attractive to oﬀer the composite product because the composite product is of higher quality than the
low-quality product (11) and high-valuation consumers value an increase in quality more highly than
low-valuation consumers: θH(qC − qL) > θL(qC − qL), or equivalently θHqC − θLqC > θHqL − θLqL.
This logic also applies to the impact of increases in production cost parameters i and K.
Result 8 Consumers may prefer a firm with higher production cost parameters to a firm with lower
production cost parameters.
5 Summary and Discussion of Assumptions
We have analyzed the problem of designing the product line for a firm that has to explicitly consider
associated production costs. We used a stylized model that allowed us to obtain several insights that
expand our understanding of joint marketing-manufacturing decisions, as well as our understanding
of the impact of information asymmetry with respect to consumer preferences on a firm’s decisions.
These insights often go counter to our intuition and sometimes go counter to the classical results
in the economics and marketing literatures, where setup and holding costs are not considered. We
have demonstrated that complex interactions exist between product line design and production
scheduling decisions: the number of products aﬀects the extent of the economies of scale, product
quality aﬀects inventory holding costs and vice versa, and together they aﬀect setup costs and
prices. As a result, common intuition may not predict the direction of these interactions correctly.
Our work suggests that heterogeneity in consumer tastes, relative sizes of consumer segments,
and information about consumer preferences be considered in empirical eﬀorts. All these environ-
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mental variables impact product-line decisions and corresponding production costs, and omitting
them from econometric tests may lead to incomplete results. For example, a firm with fewer prod-
ucts of higher quality may have production costs that are higher than a firm with more products
of lower quality. Furthermore, we show that product price may not be a good proxy for production
cost parameters (in fact, these two are inversely related in our model) so there is a need to directly
estimate production costs, although this is a challenging task (see Bayus and Putsis 1999). Finding
the right proxies for these variables and studying the relationship between product line design and
production costs empirically should prove to be a fruitful direction for future research.
Practical examples appear to be consistent with the product line structure predicted by our
model. For example, in the auto industry, Toyota is well-known for having developed a flexible
production process with low setup costs (in our terminology, less expensive production technology).
In the sedan and sport utility categories, Toyota produces both middle-market Toyota and premium
Lexus vehicles in the same plant. This is consistent with our model in that within each of these
vehicle categories there is substantial consumer heterogeneity. This, coupled with Toyota’s eﬃcient
production technology, leads to broad product variety where individual models are tailored to spe-
cific consumer segments (area (i) of Figure 3). In the European sports car category, manufacturers
(e.g., Porsche) typically do not oﬀer low-end versions of their products, partially because they target
high-end consumer segments and do not want to cannibalize sales of high-end products. Note that,
even though these companies employ manual production processes with limited flexibility, they still
oﬀer products of very high quality (area (iii) of Figure 3 rather than area (ii)) so that the main
driving force behind low product variety is probably cannibalization, not high production costs.
Finally, in the minivan category, consumers are more homogenous, and so each auto-brand oﬀers
essentially one model of vehicle in this category and that model serves a broad range of the potential
market (area (ii) of Figure 3). Although there are issues at play in these examples that are not
captured in our model, we believe that insights oﬀered by our model are nonetheless relevant.
Like all models, ours has limitations. First, our results rely on the assumptions that each
production batch incurs a fixed cost and that inventoried products incur holding costs that are
proportional to the unit production cost (which is a quality-dependent). These assumptions may not
hold. For example, a firm may choose to have a “setup crew” available so that the incremental setup
cost becomes negligible. Alternately, a firm’s holding costs might be independent of product quality
(e.g., if holding costs are driven by fixed costs associated with operating warehouses rather than the
capital cost associated with inventory). In either situation, the assumptions of our model would be
violated and therefore key insights would change as well. Second, our model ignores competition.
In particular, our model is concerned with short-term profit maximization in that it ignores more
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strategic considerations of market share or sales growth; such considerations may favor a product
line that sacrifices near-term profit in exchange for greater profit in the longer-term. Third, our
model assumes the demand is deterministic and the production is instantaneous. Although our
results continue to hold when production is not instantaneous, provided that the production rate
is suﬃciently high, incorporating stochastic demand together with non-zero production lead times
would require a substantially diﬀerent setup. We believe that incorporating stochastic demand
and/or competition may prove to be fruitful in future research.
Finally, we have assumed that there are only two consumer segments, the valuation function is
multiplicatively separable, and the quality cost is quadratic. The remainder of the paper describes
the extent to which our results continue to hold when these assumptions are relaxed; the details
behind these extensions are provided in Netessine and Taylor (2006).
More Than Two Consumer Segments
It is rather straightforward to extend our problem formulation to more than two consumer
segments. The key product-line decisions are still which consumer segments to serve and how
segments should be pooled, if at all. For any such segmentation, following the approach in §3, it is
straightforward to obtain optimal prices, production lot sizes and consequent profits in closed form.
Figures 8 and 9 display the optimal product line under full and asymmetric information, respectively,
for the case with three segments in which consumer segment valuations form a geometric progression
θt = φαt, where φ > 0 and α > 1 for t = 1, 2, 3 and consumer segments are of equal size λt = λ. The
figures depict the optimal segmentation as a function of the aggregate measure of the production
cost parameters Z and consumer heterogeneity α. For example, {1}{2, 3} corresponds to oﬀering
two products so that the lowest valuation segment buys one product and the two higher valuation
segments buy the second product. The figures depict the structure of the solution, which is invariant
to the choice of φ and λ (changing φ or λ corresponds to simply rescaling the vertical axis).
The figures demonstrate that the essential insights from §3 extend when there are more than
two consumer segments: under full and asymmetric information, if consumer segments are similar
and production costs are high, it is optimal to pool segments by oﬀering a composite product. If
consumer segments are very diﬀerent, it is optimal to oﬀer distinct products to each segment served.
As consumer heterogeneity increases, it is optimal to abandon low-end consumer segments more
quickly under asymmetric information. The number of products oﬀered may be lower or higher
under asymmetric information. As in §3, information asymmetry distorts the number of products
higher when consumer heterogeneity is moderate and production costs are small.
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Just as Figures 2 and 3 graphically illustrate the analytical results providing the optimal product-
line decisions in closed form in Propositions 1 and 2, so Figures 8 and 9 correspond to closed-form
analytical characterizations of the optimal product line. When the number of consumer segments is
large, the optimal product line is the solution to a large-scale combinatorial optimization problem
and a numerical solution along the lines of the approach in Dobson and Kalish (1988) might be
needed. Further complexity is added in the limiting case in which one faces a continuum of consumer
types. Then, for example, as the production cost parameters Z go to zero, the number of products
oﬀered under full information goes to infinity, which makes characterizing the optimal product line
for general Z diﬃcult. Further, when the number of products is unbounded it is diﬃcult to compare
the outcome with our previous results. To facilitate a comparison, we focus on the case where the
firm oﬀers at most two products and where consumer types θ are distributed uniformly on [A,B].
The restriction on the number of products is without loss of generality when the production cost
parameters Z are suﬃciently large, because then it is optimal to oﬀer at most two products. With a
continuum of consumer types, the sizes of the segments are endogenous. In particular, it is optimal
to segment the market so that consumers of type [θH , B] purchase a higher quality product and
consumers of type [θL, θH) purchase a lower quality product, where θL and θH are decision variables
and θL ≤ θH .
To characterize the extent to which our main insights continue to hold, we conducted a numerical
study of the 36, 800 parameter combinations of A = {1, 2, 4, 8}, B = {A+0.2, A+0.4, .., A+2.0}, and
Z = {0.00, 0.02, .., 9.00}, where λ is normalized to unity. (This parameter set allows for considering
the impact of the cost-related parameters a, i and K individually; to examine the impact of a,
when i and K are fixed, we fixed the product iK at unity.) Because the segments are endogenous,
the second part of Result 1, Result 5, and the first part of Result 6 are not meaningful. All of the
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remaining assertions in Results 1-8 are consistent with the numerical results. However, there are
some caveats. In contrast to the two-type case, the value of information about consumer preferences
will always be positive. Further, some of the results change when A = 0, so that some consumers
have very low valuations. In this case, one can characterize the optimal product line analytically; it
is never optimal to serve the entire market with a single product (i.e., oﬀer a composite product),
so the structure of the solution diﬀers. Further, the results in §4 that rely on the firm oﬀering a
composite product for at least some parameters do not extend to the case with A = 0.We conclude
that the extent to which our results extend when consumer types are distributed uniformly depends
on the support of the distribution, but that our extensive numerical study suggests that, when no
consumers have extremely small valuations, the main insights continue to hold.
Generalized Valuation and Quality Cost Functions
We have assumed that the valuation function is multiplicatively separable and that the quality
cost is quadratic largely for analytical convenience: under these assumptions we are able to solve
the problem in closed form. Without these assumptions, all solutions become implicit rather than
explicit, which limits insights that can be derived from the model. However, we have verified that
most of our insights remain unchanged when assumptions about the specific functional forms are
generalized as follows. We assume that consumers have a continuous, twice-diﬀerentiable valuation
function V (θ, q) which satisfies the following (rather standard) technical assumptions: Vq > 0, Vθ >
0, Vqθ > 0 and V (0, q) = V (θ, 0) = 0, where subscripts denote partial derivatives. Furthermore, we
assume that the quality cost g(q) is a continuous, twice-diﬀerentiable and increasing. Finally, we
assume that the profit functions are unimodal in qL, qH and qC (a simple suﬃcient condition for
this would be 2g00 (q) g (q) > (g0 (q))2) and that Vq(θL, 0) > g0(0), so that the low-type segment is
viable.
Under these assumptions, the structure of the optimal product line as reflected in Figures 2-3
is preserved with minor exceptions: namely, in both figures the boundaries between areas (ii) and
(iii) and boundaries of the “Sell nothing” area need not be linear, and moreover, in Figure 3 the
boundary between areas (i) and (iii) need not be linear either. Furthermore, Results 1, 2, and 8
hold without changes. The surprising part of Result 3, that the quality of the product purchased
by low-valuation consumers may increase in production cost parameters, continues to hold, and
Result 4 holds for individual product prices. Result 5 holds for the products purchased by the low-
and high-valuation segments, with the sole exception that the price of the product serving high-
valuation customers might not be distorted upward. However, it is hard to verify Results 3, 4 and 5
for the average quality and prices because all solutions are implicit. We believe that Results 6 and
7 may depend on the specific functional forms. We conclude that, allowing for a few exceptions, our
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results are quite robust to the assumptions about specific functional forms of the valuation function
and quality cost.
Appendix
Define
zFI = θL
p
λL + θH
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θLλL + θHλH√
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−
vuut"µθLpλL + θHpλH − θLλL + θHλH√λL + λH
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λLλH
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#+
,
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1√
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h
θL
³
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p
λL (λL + λH)
´
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³p
λLλH − λH
´
−
s∙³
θL
³
λL + λH −
p
λL (λL + λH)
´
+ θH
³p
λLλH − λH
´´2
− (θH − θL)2 λH (λL + λH)
¸+⎤
⎦ ,
where [x]+ ≡ max[x, 0].
Proof of Proposition 1: We solve the optimization problem (1) first. We begin by reducing this
six-variable optimization problem to a two-variable problem by fixing the quality levels (qL, qH)
and solving for the optimal batch sizes and prices. Because the objective function is concave in
Qt, t = L,H, we can solve for the optimal batch sizes Qt =
p
2Kλt/ (iaq2t ). Furthermore, the
firm can extract all profit from consumers by pricing at pt = θtqt, t = L,H. Substituting these
expressions back into the objective function we obtain
max
qL,qH
πFI2 =
X
t=L,H
h¡
θtqt − aq2t
¢
λt − qt
p
2Kiaλt
i
.
It is straightforward to verify that the solution to this problem is described in (i), provided that
Z < θt
√
λt; otherwise, qt = Qt = pt = 0. Finally, substituting this solution back into the objective
function, we obtain the following expression for the optimal profit:
πFI2 =
1
4a
X
t=L,H
µh
θt
p
λt − Z
i+¶2
.
We can similarly solve the optimization problem (2) with the exception that now the firm sells
the same product at two diﬀerent prices. The resulting solution is as in (ii), provided that Z <
(θLλL + θHλH) /
√
λL + λH ; otherwise, q∗C = Q
∗
C = p
∗
C = 0. The optimal profit is
πFI1 =
³£
(θLλL + θHλH) /
√
λL + λH − Z
¤+´2
4a
.
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The next step is to compare πFI1 with πFI2 which can be done by examining the function f(Z) ≡
πFI1 − πFI2. Note that θH > θL(1 +
p
1 + λL/λH) implies f(Z) < 0 and θL
√
λL < zFI . Therefore,
if Z < θL
√
λL, the solution is (i); if θL
√
λL ≤ Z < θH
√
λH , the solution is (iii); if Z ≥ θH
√
λH ,
the solution is to oﬀer no product. Suppose instead that θH < θL(1 +
p
1 + λL/λH). Then f(Z) is
strictly concave on Z ∈ [0,min(θL
√
λL, θH
√
λH)] with f(0) < 0 < f(min(θL
√
λL, θH
√
λH)); f(Z)
is convex, decreasing on Z ∈ [min(θL
√
λL, θH
√
λH), (θLλL + θHλH)/
√
λL + λH ] with f((θLλL +
θHλH)/
√
λL + λH) = 0. Therefore f(Z) = 0 has one root, zFI , and f(Z) < 0 if and only if Z < zFI .
Because zFI < θL
√
λL, the result follows.
Proof of Proposition 2: We solve the optimization problem (3) first. Notice that the objective
function is concave in Qt, t = L,H so we can solve for the optimal batch sizes Qt =
p
2Kλt/ (iaq2t ).
Thus, (3) simplifies to
max
qL,qH ,pL,pH
πAI2 =
X
t=L,H
h¡
pt − aq2t
¢
λt − qt
p
2Kiaλt
i
s.t. (4), (5), (6) and (7).
Consider the relaxed problem that includes (4) and (7) and excludes (5) and (6). Clearly, con-
straint (4) must bind, as otherwise one can simultaneously increase pL and pH by the same amount
without violating any constraint. Clearly, (7) must bind, as otherwise one can increase pH . It is
straightforward to verify that the solution to this problem is
qL =
£
θL − (θH − θL)λH/λL − Z/
√
λL
¤+
2a
, qH =
£
θH − Z/
√
λH
¤+
2a
and that the solution to the relaxed problem satisfies (5) and (6). Finally, substituting the solution
back into the objective function we obtain the following expression for optimal profit:
πAI2 =
³£
(θLλL − (θH − θL)λH)/
√
λL − Z
¤+´2
4a
+
³£
θH
√
λH − Z
¤+´2
4a
.
Next we solve the optimization problem (8). Clearly, constraint (9) must bind. By the argument
in the proof of Proposition 1, the solution is as in (ii), provided that Z < θL
√
λL + λH ; otherwise,
qC = QC = pC = 0. The optimal profit is
πAI1 =
³£
θL
√
λL + λH − Z
¤+´2
4a
.
The next step is to compare πAI1 with πAI2, which can be done by examining the function F (Z) ≡
πAI1 − πAI2. Note that θH > θL
p
1 + λL/λH implies F (Z) < 0 and (θLλL − (θH − θL)λH) /
√
λL <
zFI . Therefore, if Z < (θLλL − (θH − θL)λH) /
√
λL, the solution is (i); if (θLλL − (θH − θL)λH) /
√
λL ≤
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Z < θH
√
λH , the solution is (iii); if Z ≥ θH
√
λH , the solution is to oﬀer no product. Suppose instead
that θH < θL
p
1 + λL/λH . Then F (Z) is strictly concave on Z ∈
£
0,min((θLλL − (θH − θL)λH) /
√
λL,
θH
√
λH)
¤
with F (0) < 0 < F (min((θLλL − (θH − θL)λH) /
√
λL, θH
√
λH)); F (Z) is convex, decreas-
ing on Z ∈ [min((θLλL − (θH − θL)λH) /
√
λL, θH
√
λH), θL
√
λL + λH ] with F (θL
√
λL + λH) = 0.
Therefore F (Z) = 0 has one root, zAI , and F (Z) < 0 if and only if Z < zAI . Because zAI <
(θLλL − (θH − θL)λH) /
√
λL, the result follows. .
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